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Abstract:
The deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base creates an incentive
for acquiring companies to finance a takeover with debt. In this paper, I investigate
the impact of profit taxation on the financing decision in corporate acquisitions for the
first time for a sample of different acquirer-countries mainly in Europe. The likelihood
to observe a debt-financed acquisition is found to increase in the acquirer's tax rate. In
addition, I take into account that the financing decisions of particular acquisitions might
not be independent from other investment decisions. Therefore, I analyze the acquirer's
capital structure development around the acquisition and find an increase in the statutory
tax rate by one %-point to be associated with a stronger increase in the debt ratio by
0.55%-points during the acquisition period.
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Non-Technical Summary
I examine the extent to which acquiring companies make use of the tax advantage of
debt-financing in the acquisition period. The intuition is that companies can reduce their
tax burden by means of debt-financing because interest expenses are deductible from the
corporate tax base and therefore create a tax shield. In contrast, dividends, in a sense
the interest payments to equity providers, are not deductible.
The relevance of interest tax shields for acquiring companies was highlighted by the
French announcement of increasing taxes and at the same time restricting the deductibility
of interest expenses in 2012. Private equity firms, which often undertake mainly debt-
financed acquisitions, heavily complained about this notification and even threatened to
leave France.
The tax advantage of debt might lead to economically inefficient high debt ratios and,
therefore, to higher risk of financial distress and lower resistance to crisis. Moreover, it can
make acquisitions profitable, which would not occur in a world without tax discrimination
of equity. Furthermore, multinational companies face tax planning opportunities when it
comes to the financing decision of corporate acquisitions due to the different tax systems
and tax rates in the countries their subsidiaries are located in.
I have analyzed the financing decision in corporate acquisitions between 2001 and 2011
across many, mainly European countries. The empirical approach consisted of two parts.
First, I examined the probability to observe a debt-financed deal. Second, I took a
look at the acquirer-companies' debt ratio developments during the acquisition period.
My findings suggest that a one %-point increase in the acquirer-country statutory tax
rate is associated with an increase in the debt ratio by 0.55%-points. Furthermore, the
probability to observe an at least partly debt-financed deal increases on average by 1.58%-
points for all acquirers and by 2.03%-points for the subsample of profitable acquirers if
the tax rate increases by one %-point. Restricting the sample to multinational acquirers,
I found that a possible tax consolidation in the target-country may enhance the use of
equity if the acquirer is profitable, because losses of the target-company can be used to
reduce the taxable profit of the acquiring company. In addition, the acquirer's tax rate
effect also depends on the affiliated companies' tax rates. The higher the weighted average
tax rate of affiliates outside the acquirer-country, the lower the effect of the acquirer's tax
rate on its capital structure development.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht anhand von Unternehmensübernahmen in mehreren,
hauptsächlich Europäischen Ländern zwischen 2001 und 2011, inwiefern Erwerberge-
sellschaften den steuerlichen Vorteil der Fremdfinanzierung während der Übernahmephase
nutzen. Fremdfinanzierung führt zu einer Reduktion der Steuerlast, da Zinsaufwendungen
im Gegensatz zu Dividenden die steuerliche Bemessungsgrundlage bei der Gewinnermitt-
lung verringern und somit als Steuerschutzschild fungieren.
Die Relevanz von Zinsen als Steuerschutzschild für Erwerbergesellschaften hat sich im
Jahr 2012 bei der Ankündigung der Französischen Regierung gezeigt, Steuern auf Invest-
mentgewinne zu erhöhen gleichzeitig und die Abzugsfähigkeit von Fremdkapitalzinsen zu
begrenzen. Private Equity Firmen, die häufig hauptsächlich fremdfinanzierte Übernah-
men durchführen, haben sich lautstark über diese Ankündigungen beschwert und sogar
damit gedroht, Frankreich zu verlassen.
Der Steuervorteil der Fremdfinanzierung kann zu ineffizient hohen Verschuldungsgraden
führen und damit die Krisenfestigkeit negativ beeinträchtigen. Darüber hinaus können
fremdfinanzierte Übernahmen nur durch die steuerlichen Vorteile des Zinsabzugs profita-
bel werden. Weiterhin bieten sich für multinational agierende Konzerne durch über Län-
dergrenzen hinweg unterschiedliche Steuersystemen und insbesondere Steuersätze Steuer-
planungsmöglichkeiten.
In der vorliegenden Studie wird zum Einen die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine fremdfi-
nanzierte Übernahme betrachtet. Zum Anderen ist die Entwicklung der gesamten Kapi-
talstruktur der Erwerbergesellschaften Untersuchungsgegenstand. Die Ergebnisse zeigen,
dass eine ein %-Punkt Erhöhung des Körperschaftsteuersatzes im Erwerberland mit einer
relativen Erhöhung des Verschuldungsgrades der Erwerbergesellschaft um 0.55 %-Punkte
einhergeht. Weiterhin steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine fremdfinanzierte Übernahme
bei einer ein %-Punkt Erhöhung des Steuersatzes um 1.58 %-Punkte für die Gesamtheit
aller Erwerber und um 2.03 %-Punkte für die Gruppe der profitablen Erwerber. Bei einer
getrennten Betrachtung von multinationalen Erwerbergesellschaften ist ein potentieller
Zusammenhang zwischen der Möglichkeit der steuerlichen Konsolidierung des Erwerber-
und Zielunternehmens und einer verstärkten Eigenkapitalfinanzierung zu erkennen. Dieser
kann dadurch entstehen, dass bestehende Verluste des Zielunternehmens vom Erwerber
genutzt werden können, um die eigene steuerliche Bemessungsgrundlage zu verringern.
Darüber hinaus hängt der Effekt des Erwerberlandsteuersatzes von den Steuersätzen der
verbundenen Unternehmen des Erwerbers außerhalb des Erwerberlandes ab.
1 Introduction
In September 2012, France published plans to increase taxes on investment income and
to restrict the deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base. This an-
nouncement led to massive complaints from fund managers. They stated that this would
mean the death of private equity in France.1 One reason for this reaction might be that
acquisitions undertaken by private equity companies are often primarily debt-financed.
This results in significant interest expenses due to the large deal values of acquisitions of
whole companies.
In my sample, there are indeed many acquirers showing a strong increase in the interest
expenses after the deal. For example, the interest expenses of Linde AG rose from EUR
145 million to EUR 271 million after the mainly debt-financed acquisition of BOC Group
in 2006 because of the large deal value amounting EUR 12.2 billion. Another example is
the acquisition of Cumerio sa/nv by Norddeutsche Affinerie AG in 2008 valued at EUR
543.7 million. The net interest expenses of the acquirer increased from 1.4 million EUR
before the deal to EUR 20.3 million after the deal.2
As a result, a restriction on the deductibility of such expenses may significantly increase
the tax burden of acquiring companies. The large fraction of debt-financing in certain
corporate acquisitions could be attributed to the difficulty in issuing equity for large deals.
However, there might also be a tax effect. The tax deductibility creates an interest tax
shield and therefore incentivizes debt-financing. This debt bias is already known and has
been investigated in the empirical literature3 and over-indebtedness has received increased
attention during the recent financial crisis4. Mergers and acquisitions are a special case
of large investments and have experienced increasing importance with respect to foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the last decades.5 Therefore, I have analyzed to what extent
the financing decision in corporate acquisitions and the capital structure of acquiring
companies are influenced by profit taxation.
I contribute to the literature by analyzing the tax effects on the financing decision in
corporate acquisitions in a sample of several, mainly European acquirer-countries. In
addition, I combine an analysis of the specific deal financing decisions and of the overall
capital structure development of the acquiring companies in the deal period. My main
1See Chassany (2012).
2See Linde (2006) and Norddeutsche Affinerie (2009) for these figures.
3See the meta-study by Feld et al. (2013), for example.
4See Liu and Rosenberg (2013)
5See Desai and Hines (2003).
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finding is that higher tax rates do indeed increase the acquirers' debt-to-asset ratios in
the acquisition period. An analysis of deals between 2001 and 2011 with an acquirer in
one of 21 European countries showed that a one %-point increase in the statutory tax
rate is associated with an increase in the debt ratio by 0.55%-points. Furthermore, the
probability to observe an at least partly debt-financed deal increases on average by 1.58%-
points for all acquirers and by 2.03%-points for the subsample of profitable acquirers if
the tax rate increases by one %-point.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the recent
empirical literature, section 3 develops the main hypotheses and section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 illustrates the empirical approach, section 6 presents the results and
section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Auerbach (2002), Graham(2003) and a meta-study by Feld et al. (2013) provide overviews
of the existing empirical literature on the effects of taxes on the capital structure of
companies. Most of the studies find a positive relationship between the tax rate and
the debt-to-asset ratio. They vary in the type of proxy employed for the marginal tax
advantage of debt, the empirical methods used and the kind of firms investigated. While
some studies only focus on one country (for example Graham et al. (1998) and Graham
(1999), which use simulated marginal tax rates of U.S. corporations), others examine
tax effects across several countries (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995)). In addition, some
studies focus on domestic firms (e.g. Overesch and Voeller (2010)), while others analyze
the financing decisions of multinational companies (e.g. Altshuler and Grubert (2003),
Huizinga et al. (2008) and Møen et al. (2011)).
Desai and Hines (2003) point out, that the share of mergers and acquisitions in FDI
has increased significantly in the last decades and has become the largest part of FDI,
underlining the economic importance of such kind of investment. Concerning the financing
decision of corporate acquisitions, there are already several papers dealing with non-
tax determinants of the method of payment. Studies like Amihud et al. (1990), Martin
(1996) and Gosh and Ruland (1998) examine the role of growth opportunities, managerial
ownership or cash availability of the acquirer. Analyzing deals within Europe, Faccio and
Masulis (2005) also investigate the countervailing effects of corporate control of managers
and existing shareholders, that decrease by stock-financing and the financing constraints
linked to debt. Using mergers of publicly listed U.S. firms, Ismail and Krause (2010) find
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a significant impact of the correlation of acquirer and target pre-deal returns, of hostility
of the merger and of defense mechanisms for the acquirer on the method of payment. Bi
and Gregory (2011) focus on the over-valuation of acquirers. Madura and Ngo (2012)
analyze acquisitions of private firms and find an information asymmetry effect.
The first study to investigate the tax advantage of debt-financing in corporate acqui-
sitions is Auerbach and Reishus (1988). The authors only find a small increase of debt
ratios of acquiring companies after acquisitions. In contrast, the use of tax losses and
credits was found to be more relevant. However, Erickson (1998) finds that higher tax
rates increase the probability to observe a debt-financed acquisition by analyzing 100%
debt-financed cash deals and 100% equity-financed stock deals in the U.S. Dhaliwal et al.
(2005) also analyze U.S. deals but take into account the possibility to finance a corporate
acquisition through retained earnings. Therefore, the authors only consider cash deals.
The main finding of this study is that the foreign tax credit limitations in the U.S. signifi-
cantly influence the decision to use debt or internal funds for the financing of a cash deal.
Another study by Gosh et al. (2011) uses a panel approach in order to analyze effects of
taxes on the debt issuance of U.S. acquirers in the years after an acquisition.
In contrast to prior studies, I have examined tax effects for deals undertaken in several
countries, mainly in Europe. Furthermore, I have analyzed both public and private firms
and the acquisitions labeled as equity-financed in my sample refer to both cash deals and
share deals. Besides the investigation of the probability to observe a debt-financed deal, I
have also evaluated the development of the acquirers' debt ratios during the deal period.
I found empirical evidence for a higher probability of debt-financing if the acquirer faces
a high tax rate and for the impact of tax rates on the capital structure around the deal.
Moreover, I have investigated the specific tax incentives for multinational companies.
3 Development of Hypotheses
Graham (2003) summarizes the main findings of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and
Miller (1977): If an investment is purely equity-financed, the net earnings will be taxed
with the corporate income tax rate τC at the company level and, in addition, dividends
will be taxed at the shareholder level with the income tax rate τP . If the investment is
debt-financed, the interest payments to the capital provider are not taxed at the company
level because they are deductible from the corporate tax base. However, such payments
are taxed at the level of the capital provider with the interest tax rate τ I . Therefore, the
difference in the tax burden between equity- and debt-financing of an investment with net
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earnings pi and the interest expenses iD is
∆TAX := TAXequity − TAXdebt, (1)
with
TAXequity := pi[τ
C + (1− τC)τP ] (2)
and
TAXdebt := (pi − iD)τC + [pi − (pi − iD)τC − iD]τP + iDτ I , (3)
where i is the interest rate and D is the amount of debt, respectively. After rearranging
terms we get
∆TAX = iD[τC + (1− τC)τP − τ I ], (4)
For simplicity, we now assume that τP and τ I equal zero. In reality, personal taxes might
be irrelevant for the financing decision if the company is very large and has diversified
shareholders in different countries and tax brackets. The management then does not know
and cannot take into account the taxation of individual shareholders and just considers
corporate taxation.6 In that case, equation (4) reduces to
∆TAX = iDτC . (5)
In this equation, we immediately see that the theoretical tax advantage of debt increases
in the statutory corporate income tax rate. However, there are also negative aspects
of debt-financing. Several studies have modeled these disadvantages, explaining why we
do not observe 100% debt-financed companies, for example, because of financial distress
costs or the restricted access to the capital market due to excess demand or insufficient
collaterals.7 Yet, even if we control for these issues, the tax rate is nevertheless supposed
to influence the financing decision of corporations.
This theory can be adopted for corporate acquisitions. Acquirers expect benefits by
yielding synergies. In contrast, they have to bear the costs. If the deal is equity-financed
and paid with cash, the cash cannot be used for dividend distribution. Alternatively,
disbursing with own shares reduces the influence in the own company. If the deal is debt-
financed, the interest expenses lower the distributable profits in the future and reduce
the financial room to maneuver. The acquirer tries to minimize the acquisition costs.
6In my empirical analysis, I focused on the company taxation for the same reasons and employ personal
taxation only in sensitivity analyses. Concentrating on corporate taxation is in line with the existing
empirical literature on capital structure decisions of multinational companies, compare Desai et al.
(2004) and Huizinga et al. (2008), for example.
7See Graham (2003) for an overview.
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Debt-financing can be part of that strategy if the deductibility of interest expenses helps
in saving taxes. Thus, ceteris paribus, a higher tax rate should positively influence the
probability to use debt for the deal financing as the tax shield increases in the tax rate.
Using variation of statutory tax rates across countries and over time, I state the first
hypothesis:
H 1. Acquirer-companies in high-tax countries have a higher probability to use debt to
finance a corporate acquisition than companies in low-tax countries.
In addition to the specific decision of how to finance the acquisition, I analyzed the
capital structure change of the acquiring companies during the deal period. By considering
the development of the debt-to-asset ratio of the acquirer, I took into account that the
financing decision might not be independent of other investments undertaken in the same
period. Furthermore, looking at the change of the debt ratio also gives information on how
much debt is used in the acquisition period, whereas in the analysis of the probability to
observe a debt-financed deal, one does not know the fraction of debt-financing. Concerning
the capital structure, I state the following hypothesis:
H 2. The debt-to-asset ratios of acquirers in high-tax countries should increase during the
acquisition period compared to acquiring companies in low-tax countries.
An acquisition is an additional investment, hence, the marginal tax incentive is relevant
for the financing decision. If additional interest expenses do not further reduce the tax
base, there is no incentive for debt-financing from a tax point of view. This situation
is referred to as "tax exhaustion" in the literature.8 The proposed tax effect should
thus especially be observed for companies having taxable profits that can be reduced by
additional interest expenses. In contrast, non-profitable acquirers have no incentive to
save taxes.9 Therefore, I state the third hypothesis:
H 3. The effect of taxes on the probability to observe a debt-financed deal and the effect
on the debt ratio depends on the profit or loss situation of the acquiring company.
The hypotheses derived above are valid for both domestic and multinational companies.
Moreover, for multinationals there are additional tax aspects of corporate acquisitions.
Facing different tax systems and rates in the countries of subsidiaries locations, the op-
portunities for tax planning are manifold. Multinationals are found to have incentives
8See MacKie-Mason (1990), for example.
9Erickson (1998), for example, uses a trichotomous tax variable capturing if the acquirer is near tax
exhaustion.
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for higher internal and overall debt ratios compared to national firms especially if they
are majority-owned.10 Additionally, evidence indicates that multinationals use tax rate
differences for profit shifting11.
Ruf (2010) summarizes the tax structuring options in international acquisitions. Gener-
ally, multinationals can decide to acquire a given target-company through an acquisition
vehicle in the target-country or via a subsidiary in a different country. In the first case,
the profits and losses of the acquiring and the target-company can be offset, if tax consol-
idation is possible. The effect of consolidation opportunities on the probability to observe
a debt-financed deal should be positive if the acquirer suffers a loss after a debt-financed
deal due to high additional interest expenses. If a profitable acquirer-company can lower
its taxable income by using target loss carry-forwards as a non-debt tax shield, the need
to finance the acquisition with debt in order to further reduce the taxable income by ad-
ditional interest expenses is smaller. Thus, a negative effect is expected in this situation.
Furthermore, a multinational can use tax rate differences within the group to reduce
the acquisition costs. If a subsidiary in a high-tax country takes out a loan for the
acquisition of a target-company in a low-tax country, the costs for the acquisition, i.e. the
interest expenses, are deductible from the tax base in a high-tax country. In contrast,
the earnings from the acquisition, i.e. the increased profits of the target-company due
to synergies, are taxable in a low-tax country. Thus, the higher the tax rate difference
between the acquirer and the target-company, the higher the incentives for debt financing.
In addition, a subsidiary in a low-tax country can provide a loan to the acquisition vehicle
in the high-tax country. This causes additional tax savings because interest expenses are
deducted in the high-tax country (acquiring subsidiary), but interest earnings are taxable
in a low-tax country (loan providing subsidiary). These considerations lead to the next
hypothesis:
H 4. The financing decision of multinational companies in the acquisition period is influ-
enced by a possible group taxation and different tax rates within the multinational group.
10See Schindler and Schjelderup (2010).
11See Møen et al. (2011) and Huizinga et al. (2008).
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For the purpose of my analysis, I have used firm-level data from Zephyr and Amadeus,
two databases of Bureau van Dijk. Zephyr provides information about mergers and ac-
quisitions and the involved parties in several countries since 1996. I used all mergers and
acquisitions with one acquirer- and target-company completed between 1998 and 2011
and yielding a majority stake in the target-company. I restricted my analysis to obser-
vations in which the acquirer- and target-companies are corporations and the industry
is not public administration, financial industry, activities of households as employers or
activities of extraterritorial organizations. Amadeus is a firm-level database providing
unconsolidated accounting data of European companies. For my final sample, I dropped
observations with implausible values for the financial variables such as profit, size, EBIT,
market capitalization, equity, depreciation, financial result and debt ratio.12
4.1 Tax Data
For the empirical analysis, I used corporate and personal tax data for the year of the
completion date in the respective acquirer-country.13 τCacq is the corporate income tax rate
that combines national and local taxes. Since in some countries interest expenses are
only deductible from the base of certain taxes14, the tax advantage of debt-financing as
depicted in equation (4) changes to
∆TAX = iD[φτCacq + τ
D
acq − τ Iacq], (6)
where φ is the fraction of τCacq, for which interest deductibility is possible and τ
D
acq :=
(1− φτCacq)τPacq. Accordingly, the tax advantage of debt is
∆TAX = iDφτCacq (7)
in the case of irrelevant personal taxation.
12In particular, I excluded deals from the analysis, where the acquirer shows pre- or post deal profits >
thousand EUR 1.0e+07 or < thousand EUR -1.0e+07, total assets < 0 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+09,
EBIT < thousand EUR -1.0e+07 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+09, market capitalization < 0 or >=
thousand EUR 1.0e+10, shareholder funds < 0 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+09, D&Ai < 0 or >= 1,
net interest result to asset ratio < 0 or > 1 or debt-to-asset ratio < 0.
13The tax data was collected from the European Tax Handbooks edited by IBFD and from international
tax surveys provided by Ernst & Young, PwC, and KPMG. Overesch and Voeller (2010) use this data
as well and describe the composition of the tax rates in detail.
14For example, in Germany interest expenses are fully deductible from the corporate income tax base
but only partly from the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer).
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Table 1: Tax variables for acquirer-countries in 2011
Acquirer-country φτCacq τ
D
acq τ
I
acq
Austria 0.2500 0.1875 0.2500
Belgium 0.3399 0.1650 0.1500
Bulgaria 0.1000 0.0450 0.0000
Cyprus 0.1000 0.1350 0.1000
Czech Republic 0.1900 0.1215 0.1500
Denmark 0.2500 0.3150 0.4750
Estonia 0.2100 0.0000 0.2100
Finland 0.2450 0.1480 0.2800
France 0.3444 0.2052 0.3130
Germany 0.2717 0.1921 0.2638
Greece 0.2000 0.1680 0.1000
Hungary 0.1900 0.1296 0.0000
Ireland 0.1250 0.4463 0.2700
Italy 0.2751 0.1669 0.1250
Japan 0.4035 0.2601 0.5000
Korea 0.2420 0.4178 0.3850
Latvia 0.1500 0.0850 0.1000
Lithuania 0.1500 0.1700 0.0000
Luxembourg 0.2880 0.1500 0.1000
Netherlands 0.2500 0.1875 0.2500
Norway 0.2800 0.0000 0.2800
Poland 0.1900 0.1539 0.1900
Portugal 0.2750 0.1559 0.1650
Romania 0.1600 0.1344 0.1600
Russia 0.2000 0.0720 0.1300
Singapore 0.1700 0.0000 0.2000
Slovakia 0.1900 0.0000 0.1900
Slovenia 0.2000 0.1600 0.2000
Spain 0.3000 0.1470 0.2100
Sweden 0.2630 0.2211 0.3000
Turkey 0.2000 0.1400 0.1500
Ukraine 0.2300 0.0385 0.0500
United Kingdom 0.2600 0.2672 0.5000
United States 0.3787 0.1348 0.4170
In the U.S., τCacq was 0.4007 for non-manufacturers in
2011.
In my analysis, I employed φτCacq, τ
D
acq and τ
I
acq as independent variables. For τ
P
acq and
τ Iacq, I used the top bracket tax rates on dividends and on interest for loans provided to
companies, respectively. The assignment of personal tax rates to countries was executed
by using the acquirer-country. In reality, there might in fact be many companies having
shareholders abroad. Due to lack of information about the location of the shareholders of
the specific companies, one cannot be sure that these tax rates really capture the personal
tax burden. However, relying on the literature of home bias in investment decisions (e.g.
French and Poterba (1991)) this procedure seems reasonable. Table 1 summarizes these
tax variables for 2011. For comparison with Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005),
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I conducted robustness checks using three dichotomous tax variables, Tax1, Tax2 and
Tax3. These variables equal φτCacq if the acquiring company is profitable in the pre-deal
period and zero otherwise.
An acquirer is defined as a member of a multinational group, if there exists at least
one 50% corporate shareholder or 50% subsidiary abroad.15 In order to test H 4, I
restricted the sample to acquirer-companies that are members of a multinational group
and employed the following variables.
Grouptax is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target-company
are located in the same country which applies a group taxation regime. Such a regime
allows an offsetting of profits and losses of different entities within a group of companies
for tax purposes.16 If the acquirer-company can offset losses arising due to high interest
expenses after a debt-financed deal with profits of the target, the probability to observe
a debt-financed deal should be higher. If a profitable acquirer can use an existing loss
carry-forward of the target-company to reduce its taxable income, the effect is supposed
to be negative because the loss serves as a non-debt tax shield.
φτCacq−τCtar is the difference between the acquirer and the target-country tax rate.17 The
higher this difference, the higher the incentive for debt-financing because acquisition costs
(interest expenses for the loan taken out for the deal) reduce the tax base in a high-tax
country and the gains from the acquisition (increasing profits in the target-company due
to synergies) are taxable in a low-tax country.
Finally, I controlled for the weighted average tax rate of the multinational group in the
acquisition year, φτCmean. The mean is weighted by the numbers of affiliates per country.
18
Thus, a high value of this variable indicates that the multinational group is a high-tax
group as it mainly consists of subsidiaries in high-tax countries. A higher average group
tax rate is supposed to positively influence the probability to observe a debt-financed deal
15As I only have access to the current ownership structure of the acquiring companies in 2012, the
multinational status does not vary over time. Thus, I might have classified acquirers to be part of a
multinational group despite their purely domestic status in the year of the acquisition.
16See Dreßler and Overesch (2013) for details of this variable. They generate and employ this indicator
for years 1996 - 2007. I used the same variable and added information for years 2008 - 2011. For the
debt ratio analysis, I used Grouptax2, which equals one if at least one target-company is located in
the acquirer-country and group taxation is possible.
17For the debt ratio analysis, I used the difference between the acquirer-country tax rate and the average
tax rate of the targets acquired in the considered period, φτCacq − τCtarmean.
18I employed tax rates from 190 countries for this analysis and assigned it to the respective 50% corporate
shareholders and subsidiaries of the acquirer. As I only have access to the current ownership structures
in 2012, there might be affiliates in the multinational group which were not part of the group in the
year of acquisition. By using the weighted means the bias by a missclassification of single affiliates
should not be too large.
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because it is possible for other affiliates to take out a loan and provide the money to the
aquiring subsidiary. For the debt ratio analysis, I used the weighted average tax rate of all
affiliates in the ownership chain outside the acquirer-country, φτCmean outside, and interacted
this variable with φτCacq. A negative interaction effect indicates that the incentive to reduce
the taxable income of the acquiring company by debt-financing is higher, if there are no
other affiliates in high-tax counties where the debt would lead to higher tax savings.
Moreover, the multinational has a stronger incentive to provide intragroup loans to the
acquiring company by a low-tax subsidiary for tax saving purposes, if there are many
low-tax affiliates in the group. Definitions of all tax variables can be found in Table 11 in
the Appendix and summary statistics are depicted in Table 3.
4.2 Dependent Variables
For the analysis of the probability to observe a debt-financed deal, the dependent variable
is an indicator that equals one if the deal is debt-financed and zero if not. As a first
step, I constructed an indicator for an at least partly debt-financed deal, Debtij, equaling
one if one or more of the entries in the respective Zephyr variables were leveraged buy
out, new bank facilities, loan notes or debt assumed, and zero if none of these information
was given but at least one of the Zephyr variables provided some information about the
deal financing or method of payment. In my base sample, 18.8% of deals are labeled as
debt-financed according to this definition.
Erickson (1998) distinguishes between 100% debt-financed and 100% equity-financed
deals. Accordingly, I defined DebtBij in a second step. With this variable, I also tried to
separate debt-financed cash deals and equity-financed stock deals. DebtBij equals one in
the same cases as Debtij but only if the deal has no vendor placing and the method of
payment is not shares. It only equals zero if vendor placing, shares, or cash and no note
about debt-financing are given. For some acquisitions the only available information was
that cash was used as a method of payment. Those observations cannot unequivocally
be classified into debt or equity-financed deals. Therefore, I employed DebtCij, which
excludes these deals. This leads to an increase of the fraction of debt-financed deals to
43.8%. Further details about the Zephyr variables containing information on the deal
financing are provided in the Appendix.
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for the analysis of
the probability to observe a debt-financed deal. The last two columns show the difference
of the average tax rate, φτCacq, between debt-financed and equity-financed acquisitions,
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Table 2: Information about deal financing
Variable Equal 1 Equal 0 % Equal 1 ∆Tax rate P-value
Debtij 698 3,019 18.8% 0.005 0.020
DebtBij 609 2,797 17.9% 0.005 0.030
DebtCij 591 759 43.8% 0.015 0.000
Numbers of debt-financed and non-debt-financed deals according to Debtij refer to
the baseline sample in Column (1) of Table 4. ∆Tax rate shows the difference of the
average φτCacq between debt-financed and non-debt-financed deals. The last column
depicts the corresponding p-value of a standard t-test with unequal variances that
this difference equals zero.
according to the employed definitions and the corresponding p-values using a standard
t-test with unequal variances. For all definitions, the average tax rate is slightly higher for
debt-financed deals with a statistically significant difference. This is a first hint towards
a potential tax effect on the financing decision.
For the acquiring company's capital structure analysis, the dependent variable is ∆Debti,
defined as the difference between the year-end debt-to-asset ratio of the acquirer after
the acquisition and the corresponding pre-deal value. The figures used to calculate this
variable stem from unconsolidated statements of the respective acquiring company. The
empirical link between the financing decision for the acquisitions in my sample and the
development of the capital structure is given by two facts. First, ∆Debti is significantly
higher in debt-financed deals than in equity-financed deals according to all my definitions
of the indicator for debt-financing using a standard t-test with unequal variances. Second,
a univariate analysis between the development of the debt ratio and the logarithm of the
sum of deal values per acquirer in the considered period results in a positive and signif-
icant correlation. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to analyze the capital structure
development of the acquiring companies during the deal period to better understand the
financing decisions with respect to acquisitions.
In the base sample with 4,389 acquirer-company-year observations, the debt ratio in-
creases on average by 2.3%-points during the deal period. The fraction of acquirers that
increase their debt ratio is 57.3%. In the group of low-tax acquirers (first quartile, i.e.
φτCacq < 26 %), this fraction is only 56.6%. For companies facing a relative high tax (last
quartile, φτCacq > 33 %), however, it is 60.4%. In addition, the average tax rate for in-
creasers is 0.3%-points higher than for decreasers. This is only a small difference but it is
statistically significant on the 10%-level and hints towards a relationship between the tax
advantage of debt-financing and the financing decision regarding corporate acquisitions.
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4.3 Control Variables
The variables used in my analysis are listed in Table 11 in the Appendix. The following
subsections describe in detail the control variables on the firm- and country-level.
4.3.1 Firm-level data
In the empirical analysis, I controlled for several firm-level variables coming from un-
consolidated statements. The logarithm of the deal value in thousand EUR of deal j,
Ln Deal valuej, is supposed to positively influence the probability to observe a debt-
financed deal because in large acquisitions the acquirer has to find multiple sources of
capital to pay the price for the target-company.19 The logarithm of acquirer i's pre-deal
total assets in thousand EUR, Sizei, is used as a proxy for the size. Larger companies
might rather be able to use retained earnings for an acquisition and it is also easier for
them to issue new equity. Consequently, larger acquirers are supposed to use less debt
in a corporate acquisition. A high pre-deal acquirer debt-to-asset ratio, Initial debti, is
expected to decrease the probability to observe a debt-financed deal, because for highly
leveraged companies a further debt issuance might be very costly, for example, if banks
demand a higher risk premium. However, a high pre-deal debt ratio might also reflect
the debt capacity of the acquirer. Therefore, it can also have a positive impact on the
probability to observe a debt-financed deal. Using information about the profits before
taxes, I constructed an indicator variable for loss-making acquiring companies, LCFi. Ac-
quirers without taxable income have no incentive to increase their leverage from a tax
point of view. However, it might be difficult to issue new equity for loss-making firms and,
therefore, they have to go to the capital market and perhaps pay higher risk premiums.20
In order to get more observations, I matched the Zephyr data with Amadeus using the
acquirer identification number and the year before the completion date of the considered
deal for pre-deal values. Using these control variables, I got a sample of 3,717 deals be-
tween 1998 and 2011 with acquirers in 31 countries for the analysis of the probability to
observe a debt-financed acquisition and a sample of 4,389 acquirers in 34 countries for the
debt ratio analysis.
In addition to the aforementioned controls, I used the following variables in my analysis,
which have a much smaller coverage mainly as most of them are only available in Amadeus.
19For the analysis of the debt ratio of the acquiring companies during the acquisition period I took the
sum of all deal values for the acquisitions undertaken by the considered company in the considered
year. For the allocation of deals to a considered year I used the date of completion.
20See Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of all these variables.
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A lower risk of financial distress might positively influence the probability to use debt for
financing an acquisition.21 In my analysis, I used Altman's (2000) Z-score as a continuous
measure of the financial distress risk. However I did not include the term for retained
earnings because this variable cannot be observed in my data. In addition, I excluded the
market equity to book debt term analogous to MacKie-Mason (1990).22 The variable used
in my analysis is Distressi. The higher this variable, the better is the acquirer's financial
situation. The amount of the acquirers' pre-deal depreciation as a fraction of total assets,
D&Ai, is a non-debt tax shield.23 The higher the depreciation, the stronger the decrease
of taxable income. As a consequence, one can expect a negative relationship between
depreciation and debt-financing. However, a high amount of depreciation may also stand
for a large value of replacement investments. Such a company might have to use more
debt to finance all of its investments in the considered period. The fraction of tangible
assets of the acquirer, Tangibilityi, may have a positive impact on debt-financing as a
large amount of tangibles serves as collateral. Furthermore, I employed the profitability
of the acquirer measured by the pre-deal EBITDA divided by total assets, Profitabilityi. I
predict a negative relationship between this variable and the probability to observe a debt-
financed deal.24 Apart from this, I controlled for the change in depreciation, tangibility
and profitability during the deal period (∆D&Ai, ∆Tangibilityi and ∆Profitabilityi) to
capture the development of these variables over time.25 In line with former studies (e.g.
Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005)), I used an indicator for a loss-making target-
company, LCFj, because existing loss carry-forwards may be offset with future profits and
accordingly serve as a non-debt tax shield. In this case the acquirer is expected to use
less debt for the acquisition.26 Considering all these additional variables, the sample size
reduces to 940 deals and 16 acquirer-countries between 2002 and 2011 for the analysis
of the probability to observe a debt-financed acquisition, and to 1,194 acquirers in 21
countries between 2001 to 2011 for the debt ratio analysis. Table 3 provides summary
statistics of the independent variables used in the regression analysis. The number of
observations per acquirer-country can be found in the Appendix in Table 12 for the
analysis of the probability to observe a debt-financed deal and in Table 13 for the debt
ratio analysis.
21See Gosh et al. (2011).
22MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that the debt ratio should be considered separately in a capital structure
analysis. In addition, I only observe the market value for very few firms.
23See e.g. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980).
24See Overesch and Voeller (2010) and Gosh et al. (2011) for a discussion of the impact of this variable.
25The change of these variables was computed using the difference between the post- and pre-deal values
in Zephyr. For the matching with Amadeus, I used the year of deal completion for post-deal values.
26For the analysis of the debt ratio of the acquiring companies during the acquisition period, I used an
indicator that equals one if at least one of the acquired target-companies shows a loss in the pre-deal
period for the acquisitions undertaken by the considered acquirer in the considered year.
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4.3.2 Country level data
Apart from the firm-level data, I also controlled for some time-varying acquirer-country-
specific variables provided by the Worldbank. Inflationacq is supposed to have a positive
impact on debt-financing according to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). They state that
inflation reduces the real value of tax shields. However, there are studies like Huizinga et
al. (2008) that find a negative effect. The authors argue that inflation causes uncertainty
about the real interest rate. Another factor is the credit market conditions, measured by
the domestic credit by banks as a percentage of GDP, Domestic creditacq. The hypothesis
is that better credit market conditions make it easier to issue new debt for a corporate
acquisition. In contrast, high valuation of domestic firms measured by the stock market
capitalization of listed firms as a percentage of the GDP, Stock marketacq, may increase the
probability to observe an equity-financed deal. The reason is that over-valuation allows
firms to yield higher prices for new equity and therefore creates an incentive for equity-
financing.27 For the same reason, I controlled for the GDP growthacq. In a prosperous
economic environment, investors might rather choose to directly participate in companies
through the equity capital market. Summary statistics for these variables are depicted in
Table 3.
5 Empirical Approach
The first approach employed in this paper models the probability to observe a debt-
financed acquisition. The hypothesis is that higher tax rates increase this probability. In
other words, acquirers are supposed to use debt rather than equity if they face higher
taxes. The dependent variable in this logit model is an indicator, Debtij, that equals
one if the deal is at least partly debt-financed and equals zero for fully equity-financed
acquisitions. Let J be the number of acquisitions in the sample and
Vij := α · φτCacq +Xijβ + δacq + δt + δind + ij (8)
be the unobservable part of the value of acquiring firm i that is determined by the capital
structure choice for a given acquisition j ∈ J , where φτCacq measures the tax advantage
of debt in the acquirer-country, Xij is a matrix of control variables, δacq, δt and δind
are acquirer-country-, time- and acquirer-industry-dummies28 and ij is an extreme value
27See Myers and Majluf (1984).
28Classification into one of 21 industries was conducted by using the first two digits of the NACE Rev.
2 codes ("broad structure", see Eurostat (2008)).
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distributed error term. α, β and the δs are parameters to be estimated and are dependent
on the choice of financing. The probability to observe a debt-financed deal equals
P (Debtij = 1) = P (V
debt
ij > V
no debt
ij ) =
exp(X˜ijβ˜)
1 + exp(X˜ijβ˜)
, (9)
where X˜ijβ˜ is the right part of equation (8) without ij. Maximizing the log-likelihood
Ln L =
∑
j∈J
Debtij · log(P (Debtij = 1)) + (1− Debtij) · log(1− P (Debtij = 1)) (10)
with respect to β˜ yields the estimates for the parameters of interest showing the effect
of the independent variables on the probability to observe a debt-financed acquisition
(Debtij = 1).29
In addition, I took a look at the development of the whole capital structure of the ac-
quiring companies during the deal period. The dependent variable, namely the difference
between the post- and pre-deal debt-to-asset ratio, ∆Debti, is a continuous one. The
main hypothesis here is that higher tax rates create an incentive for acquiring firms to
rather increase their debt ratios during the acquisition period. The specification is the
same compared to the logit model:30
∆Debti = α · φτCacq +Xiβ + δacq + δt + δind + i. (11)
Now the error term is supposed to be normally distributed and the parameters are esti-
mated using ordinary least squares (OLS). These parameters now show the linear rela-
tionship between the change in the debt ratio and the independent variables.
6 Regression Results
Table 4 shows the logit regression results for the analysis of the probability to observe a
debt-financed acquisition. The dependent variable is Debtij. Column (1) is the baseline
regression including those control variables with a relatively high coverage. The tax
advantage of debt, measured by φτCacq does not seem to influence the probability to observe
a debt-financed acquisition. In contrast, some control variables have significant impact.
29Compare Greene (2012) for equations (9) and (10).
30As several acquirers appear in more than one year, all variables are also time-dependent. For simplicity,
I abstain from using a subscript for the year.
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Table 4: Logit analysis using Debtij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Small sample Full model Profitable Interaction
φτCacq 1.3822 12.5342
∗∗ 12.6811∗∗ 15.5527∗∗ 13.5962∗∗
(0.712) (0.036) (0.035) (0.013) (0.023)
φτCacq ∗ LCFi −9.4208∗
(0.063)
Ln Deal valuej 0.4703
∗∗∗ 0.5769∗∗∗ 0.5792∗∗∗ 0.6051∗∗∗ 0.5775∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.1523∗∗∗ −0.1704∗∗∗ −0.1910∗∗∗ −0.1911∗∗ −0.1846∗∗
(0.000) (0.008) (0.010) (0.027) (0.013)
Initial debti 0.3203 0.6309 0.7654 0.3744 0.7370
(0.223) (0.177) (0.112) (0.490) (0.131)
LCFi −0.2181∗∗ −0.4047∗ −0.4559∗ 2.4247
(0.048) (0.099) (0.097) (0.134)
Inflationacq −0.0921∗ −0.0562 −0.0485 −0.0830 −0.0519
(0.065) (0.683) (0.719) (0.574) (0.712)
Domestic creditacq 0.0031 0.0147
∗ 0.0165∗∗ 0.0216∗∗ 0.0167∗∗
(0.427) (0.084) (0.048) (0.012) (0.044)
GDP growthacq −0.0808∗∗ 0.0419 0.0385 −0.0070 0.0224
(0.050) (0.671) (0.693) (0.955) (0.814)
Stock marketacq 0.0016 −0.0069 −0.0059 −0.0115 −0.0063
(0.660) (0.403) (0.479) (0.261) (0.443)
Distressi −0.0411 0.0557 −0.0389
(0.784) (0.749) (0.798)
D&Ai −4.3418 0.2372 −4.4296
(0.386) (0.964) (0.381)
∆D&Ai 3.8629 0.1648 3.7947
(0.527) (0.979) (0.535)
Tangibilityi 0.7422 −0.1461 0.6895
(0.335) (0.856) (0.386)
∆Tangibilityi −2.5072∗ −2.6192 −2.5982∗
(0.094) (0.180) (0.087)
Profitabilityi −0.3800 −2.7293 −0.1692
(0.815) (0.243) (0.918)
∆Profitabilityi −0.4252 0.5344 −0.4066
(0.746) (0.699) (0.758)
LCFj −0.2271 −0.0478 −0.2248
(0.215) (0.830) (0.218)
Observations 3,717 940 940 697 940
Log-likelihood -1,498.85 -373.52 -369.26 -284.16 -367.95
Sensitivity 18.19 % 35.86 % 35.86 % 46.67 % 36.87 %
Specificity 97.28 % 95.28 % 95.96 % 93.42 % 95.96 %
%-pts improved 1.21 3.83 4.36 6.02 4.57
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debtij . Independent variables are defined
in Table 11. In Column (1), the sample consists of domestic and cross-border deals between 1998
and 2011 with an acquirer in one of 31 countries. Column (2) restricts the sample to observations
where additional control variables are not missing and Column (3) adds these controls. In Column
(4), the sample only consists of profitable acquiring companies and in Column (5), an interaction
term between φτCacq and LCFi is used to identify a difference in the tax effect for loss-making
and profitable firms. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses.
∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level. See Table 12
for numbers of observations per acquirer-country.
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A higher deal value increases the likelihood to use debt for the deal financing since equity
alone might not be sufficient. Larger acquirers are less likely to use debt. The reason
can be the low costs of issuing new equity, for example, for listed firms. The negative
coefficient of the loss dummy, LCFi, indicates that acquirers without taxable income have
a lower incentive to use debt for the financing of a corporate acquisition in order to
reduce the tax base. Inflationacq has a negative impact, which is in line with the findings
of former studies like Huizinga et al. (2008). Moreover, a larger GDP growthacq rate
significantly lowers the probability for debt-financing, which might reflect that in good
economic times it is easier for firms to issue equity because investors are less risk-averse
and thus more willing to hold direct stake in companies. The other variables Initial debti,
Domestic creditacq and Stock marketacq do not significantly influence the financing decision
according to my findings.
Column (2) repeats the first regression using a smaller sample with information about
the full set of control variables. Results now change with respect to the tax variable. The
coefficient of φτCacq becomes larger and significant.
31 The results of the control variables
are similar to specification (1). Inflationacq and GDP growthacq do not show a significant
coefficient any more. In contrast, starting from Column (3), Domestic creditacq gets a
positive and significant coefficient indicating that the access to the capital market is
important for the financing decision, too. Column (3) adds the additional control variables
with smaller coverage. Results do not materially change. Except for ∆Tangibilityi, the
new variables do not have any statistically significant impact on the financing decision.32
In Column (4), I restricted the sample to profitable acquirers. This is why the loss
dummy, LCFi, cancels out in this specification. The coefficient of φτCacq corresponds to an
average marginal effect of 2.03. Therefore, in my sample a one %-point rise in the tax rate
is on average associated with a 2.03%-points increase in the probability to observe a debt-
financed deal. The average marginal effect for Ln Deal valuej is 0.08, indicating that a one
percent increase in the deal value increases the probability to observe a debt-financed deal
by 8%-points. For Sizei, the average marginal effect is -0.02. In the last column of Table
4, I used an interaction term between the tax variable and the loss dummy, φτCacq ∗ LCFi,
to evaluate the difference of the tax effect between profitable and loss-making firms. Since
the logit model is non-linear, the coefficients and p-values do not show the real interaction
31The change of the coefficient that comes from only reducing the sample size, might reflect that the
results in the whole sample are driven by some outliers from countries outside Europe which do not
report further information on company-specific variables. However, a selection bias cannot be ruled
out.
32The negative coefficient of ∆Tangibilityi in Column (3) and (5) might reflect the non-debt tax shield
generated by future depreciation.
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Figure 1: Interaction effect, φτCacq ∗ LCFi, in Column (5) of Table 4
effects and results have to be calculated for every observation.33 Figure 1 shows the real
interaction effects and the corresponding z-statistics. The interaction effect is negative for
all observations. However, regarding the significance, results are mixed. The interaction
effect is only significant for a smaller part of observations. For a large group of acquisitions,
especially with small or large predicted probabilities for debt-financing, the interaction is
not significant.
Concerning the model fit, the Sensitivity (Specificity) at the bottom of Table 4 shows
the percentage of correctly predicted debt-financed (non-debt-financed) deals. Another
indicator is the %-pts improved figure, which shows the additional percentage of deals
correctly specified by the model, compared to the random assumption that all deals are
non-debt-financed. E.g. specification (4): 76.33% of the deals in the sample are equity-
financed. My model predicts 82.35% = (76.33 + 6.02)% of financing decisions correctly.
Table 5 presents the results of the ordinary least square debt ratio analysis. The
dependent variable here is the change in the debt-to-asset ratio of the respective acquirer
after the deal compared to the pre-deal value, ∆Debti. Apart from that, specifications are
identical to Table 4. The tax variable φτCacq significantly influences the debt ratio across all
specifications. The coefficients range between 0.28 and 0.58. In specifications containing
the full set of controls (column (3)-(5)), the effect is between 0.52 and 0.55. Remarkably,
the tax effect does not seem to be different for profitable and loss-making firms. If I
restrict the sample to profitable acquirers in Column (4), the coefficient becomes only
slightly lower and the coefficient of the interaction term in Column (5) is not significant.
One reason for the non-significant interaction might be that the loss dummy is not a
very accurate measure to identify companies without taxable income, as my variables
33See Ai and Norton (2003).
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Table 5: OLS analysis using ∆Debti
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Small sample Full model Profitable Interaction
φτCacq 0.2840
∗∗ 0.5836∗∗∗ 0.5519∗∗ 0.5275∗∗ 0.5212∗∗
(0.039) (0.010) (0.016) (0.024) (0.028)
φτCacq ∗ LCFi 0.2857
(0.480)
Ln Deal valuesj 0.0107
∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.0125∗∗∗ −0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0089∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0091∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Initial debti −0.2462∗∗∗ −0.2403∗∗∗ −0.2629∗∗∗ −0.2183∗∗∗ −0.2616∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LCFi −0.0145∗ −0.0231∗ −0.0041 −0.0919
(0.060) (0.079) (0.783) (0.477)
Inflationacq 0.0018 0.0024 0.0033 0.0053 0.0033
(0.295) (0.580) (0.408) (0.197) (0.410)
Domestic creditacq −0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
(0.357) (0.205) (0.278) (0.280) (0.307)
GDP growthacq 0.0012 0.0009 0.0013 −0.0017 0.0013
(0.385) (0.802) (0.690) (0.575) (0.676)
Stock marketacq −0.0001 −0.0007∗∗ −0.0007∗∗ −0.0008∗∗ −0.0007∗
(0.495) (0.036) (0.042) (0.011) (0.055)
Distressi 0.0169
∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
D&Ai −0.0554 0.1167 −0.0612
(0.767) (0.616) (0.744)
∆D&Ai 0.5045
∗ 0.4750 0.4871∗
(0.087) (0.343) (0.096)
Tangibilityi 0.0658
∗ 0.0826∗∗∗ 0.0653∗
(0.062) (0.007) (0.064)
∆Tangibilityi 0.0233 −0.0630 0.0194
(0.772) (0.463) (0.813)
Profitabilityi −0.0247 −0.1832∗∗ −0.0287
(0.761) (0.024) (0.723)
∆Profitabilityi −0.0647∗∗ −0.0432∗∗∗ −0.0644∗∗
(0.040) (0.006) (0.040)
LCFsj 0.0034 0.0005 0.0029
(0.705) (0.955) (0.741)
Observations 4, 389 1, 194 1, 194 927 1, 194
Adj. R2 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17
The table shows OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆Debti. Independent variables are defined
in Table 11. In Column (1), the sample consists of domestic and cross-border deals between 1998
and 2011 with an acquirer in one of 34 countries. Column (2) restricts the sample to observations
where additional control variables are not missing and Column (3) adds these controls. In Column
(4), the sample only consists of profitable acquiring companies and in Column (5), an interaction
term between φτCacq and LCFi is used to identify a difference in the tax effect for loss-making
and profitable firms. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses.
∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level. See Table 13
for numbers of observations per acquirer-country.
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come from accounting data that might be different from tax data. Another reason can
be that I only considered the short run in my analysis. In the long run, even loss-making
acquirers can be very profitable. If already anticipated in the acquisition year, they might
nevertheless use debt in order to offset future profits with interest expenses.
In this model, the coefficients can directly be interpreted as average marginal effects.
Accordingly, the tax coefficient in Column (4) means that a one %-point tax rate increase
is on average associated with an increase in the debt ratio change of 0.53%-points. In
other words, the debt ratio on average exhibits a stronger increase or weaker decrease
by 0.53%-points, compared to another acquirer facing a one %-point lower tax rate and
being equal in all other considered characteristics. Compared to other studies dealing with
tax effects on the capital structure, this effect is rather large, indicating that acquiring
companies are particularly tax sensitive and that the tax planning opportunities in large
investments are considerable.34
With respect to the control variables, the deal values and the size of the acquiring com-
pany have the same expected effects as in the logit analysis. If the sum of deal values of all
acquisitions undertaken by the considered acquirer increases by one percent, the acquirer's
debt ratio increases by additional 1.1%-points according to Column (4). The amount of
the acquirer's size coefficient is similar. The pre-deal debt ratio of the acquiring company
has a negative impact on the capital structure development. A one %-point higher ini-
tial debt ratio decreases the change in the capital structure by 0.22%-points. Another
significant factor is the stock market capitalization. Stock marketacq has the expected
negative coefficient, although it is very small from an economic point of view. Distressi
positively influences the change in the debt ratio, indicating that acquiring companies
facing a lower risk of financial distress tend to use debt to finance their acquisitions. The
positive coefficient of ∆D&Ai might reflect that a new investment increases the need to
rely on additional debt-financing. Concerning tangibility, I found a positive impact. The
profitability, and the change of this variable during the acquisition period in particular,
influence the development of the acquirers' capital structure in a negative way. The rea-
son might be that profitable firms are rather able to use retained earnings to finance an
investment. The other variables, namely Inflationacq, Domestic creditacq, GDP growthacq,
D&Ai, ∆Tangibilityi and LCFsj do not significantly influence the change in the capital
structure of the acquiring companies during the deal period, according to my findings.
34The predicted statutory tax rate effect on the debt ratio amounts to 0.18 in the meta-study by Feld
et al. (2013). However, comparing the results of column (1) of Table 5, which uses the larger sample,
with former studies, the difference of the effects is not so large.
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Table 6: Multinational tax planning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS
φτCacq 14.5547
∗∗ 14.3820∗∗ 0.7517∗∗∗ 0.7443∗∗∗ 2.3156∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Grouptax −0.2676
(0.441)
LCFi∗Grouptax −0.1352
(0.821)
LCFj∗Grouptax 0.7163
(0.156)
φτCacq − τCtar −2.8440
(0.310)
φτCmean 8.3379
∗
(0.085)
Grouptax2 −0.0220∗∗
(0.023)
LCFi∗Grouptax2 0.0260
(0.247)
φτCacq − τCtarmean 0.1334
(0.167)
φτCmean outside 1.8185
∗∗∗
(0.009)
φτCacq∗φτCmean outside −6.0715∗∗∗
(0.007)
Ln Deal value(s)j 0.5741
∗∗∗ 0.5689∗∗∗ 0.5763∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.1847∗∗ −0.1583∗∗ −0.1683∗∗ −0.0074∗∗ −0.0071∗∗ −0.0074∗∗
(0.010) (0.035) (0.023) (0.038) (0.045) (0.037)
Initial debti 0.4567 0.1954 0.4892 −0.2258∗∗∗ −0.2242∗∗∗ −0.2272∗∗∗
(0.435) (0.732) (0.388) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LCFi −0.2916 −0.3921 −0.3436 −0.0168 0.0007 −0.0012
(0.562) (0.252) (0.319) (0.452) (0.964) (0.936)
Inflationacq 0.0907 0.0897 0.1180 0.0031 0.0035 0.0043
(0.663) (0.668) (0.579) (0.596) (0.551) (0.449)
Domestic creditacq 0.0191
∗ 0.0230∗∗ 0.0179∗ 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0001
(0.076) (0.028) (0.090) (0.974) (0.905) (0.694)
GDP growthacq 0.1383 0.1718 0.1669 −0.0010 −0.0016 −0.0016
(0.233) (0.152) (0.147) (0.756) (0.636) (0.626)
Stock marketacq −0.0040 −0.0064 −0.0077 −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0005
(0.657) (0.531) (0.353) (0.259) (0.343) (0.204)
Distressi 0.0572 0.0834 0.0514 0.0111
∗ 0.0104∗ 0.0096
(0.712) (0.593) (0.743) (0.071) (0.098) (0.128)
D&Ai −7.6741 −8.0024 −7.3843 −0.0109 −0.0138 −0.0318
(0.132) (0.122) (0.142) (0.969) (0.961) (0.911)
∆D&Ai 2.0307 1.7231 2.4095 0.5068 0.5031 0.4998
(0.751) (0.773) (0.693) (0.263) (0.264) (0.268)
Tangibilityi 1.0945 1.1188 1.1168 0.0660 0.0659 0.0746
∗
(0.254) (0.244) (0.253) (0.133) (0.131) (0.086)
∆Tangibilityi −2.6173 −2.7476 −2.6191 0.0244 0.0281 0.0340
(0.206) (0.182) (0.224) (0.841) (0.812) (0.770)
Profitabilityi −1.0405 −1.2273 −1.0182 −0.0269 −0.0195 −0.0222
(0.604) (0.525) (0.612) (0.708) (0.784) (0.752)
to be continued on the next page
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Table 6: Multinational tax planning (continued)
∆Profitabilityi −1.4894 −1.6774 −1.3590 −0.1910∗∗ −0.1975∗∗ −0.2051∗∗
(0.438) (0.365) (0.464) (0.032) (0.026) (0.020)
TarLCF(s) −0.6352∗ −0.2197 −0.1877 −0.0055 −0.0050 −0.0055
(0.065) (0.271) (0.347) (0.545) (0.590) (0.543)
Observations 770 762 773 882 875 884
Log-likelihood −304.54 −301.98 −307.13 − − −
Sensitivity 38.32 % 39.16 % 37.13 % − − −
Specificity 93.86 % 95.30 % 95.38 % − − −
%-pts improved 3.51 4.85 4.39 − − −
Adj. R2 − − − 0.15 0.15 0.15
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debtij in Columns (1) to (3) based on
Column (3) of Table 4 and OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆Debti in Columns (4) to
(6) based on Column (3) of Table 5. Independent variables are defined in Table 11. In Columns
(1) and (4), I controlled for a potential group tax regime. In Columns (2) and (5), I tested if
the financing decision is sensitive to the difference between acquirer- and target-country tax rates.
In Columns (3) and (6), I tested if the weighted average tax rate of the multinational group
influences the financing decision. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown
in parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
Table 6 shows regression results for specifications dealing with H4 about multinational
companies' financing decisions. The sample is restricted to acquirer-companies belonging
to a multinational group. The first 3 columns contain logit regressions and are based on
Column (3) of Table 4. In Column (1), I controlled for Grouptax, an indicator variable
that equals one if the acquirer and the target are located in the same country applying a
group taxation regime. I interacted this variable with the loss indicators for the acquirer-
and the target-company to test if the offsetting of potential losses of the target or the
acquiring company is more relevant. Results do not indicate a significant relationship
between a group taxation regime and the financing decision of multinational acquirers.
The reason might be that the loss indicators do not show the loss situation of past or
future years. It might be, for example, that the target exhibits a loss carry-forward from
more than one year ago that I did not observe.
In Column (2), I controlled for the difference between the acquirer and the target-
country tax rate, φτCacq − τCtar. Results do not indicate a significant impact of the tax
rate differential. This might be partly explained by the fact that it is not necessarily the
acquiring company that has to bear the acquisition costs. The multinational can also
take out a loan by a subsidiary in another high-tax country and provide the capital in the
form of equity to the acquiring entity.
In order to test how tax rates from countries other than the acquirer-country influence
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the financing decision of multinational groups, I used the weighted mean tax rate of the
international ownership chain of the acquirer, φτCmean, instead of the acquirer-country tax
rate in Column (3).35 The coefficient of φτCmean is significant and positive. Thus, the
tax rates of other countries, in which affiliates of the multinationals are located, seem to
influence the financing decisions as well. However, the average marginal effect of 1.10 is
smaller compared to specifications using φτCacq of the acquirer-country.
Columns (4) to (6) show results for the OLS debt ratio analysis based on Column (3)
of Table 5. In Column (4), I again controlled for a possible group taxation regime in the
target-countries.36 The difference of the acquirer's debt ratio during the acquisition period
is smaller if tax consolidation is possible. This effect was only found for profitable acquir-
ing companies. The negative coefficient of Grouptax2 indicates that profitable acquirers
which can use tax loss carry-forwards of the target to lower their taxable income tend to
abstain from highly debt-financed acquisitions.37 For loss-making acquirers the effect is
not significant (using a test of joint significance of Grouptax2 and LCFi∗Grouptax2 ). In
Column (5), I controlled for the difference between the acquirer tax rate and the mean
of the target tax rates in the considered year. Just like in the logit analysis, this variable
does not influence the financing decisions of the acquiring companies.38 In Column (6),
I tested if the debt development of the acquiring company also depends on tax rates of
affiliates of the multinational group in other countries. In particular, I interacted the
acquirer-country tax rate φτCacq and the weighted average tax rate of affiliates located out-
side the acquirer-country, φτCmean outside.
39 The coefficient of φτCacq shows the effect, if the
mean of the affiliates tax rates is zero. The negative interaction effect indicates that the
acquirer-country tax rate effect decreases, if the tax rates of other affiliates increase. This
can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the incentive to reduce the taxable income of the
acquiring company by debt-financing is higher if there are no other affiliates in high-tax
counties where the debt would lead to higher tax savings. Secondly, if there are many
low-tax affiliates in the group, the multinational has an incentive to provide intra-group
loans to the acquiring company by low-tax subsidiaries for tax-saving reasons.
35I weighted this mean by the number of subsidiaries in the respective countries in order to approximate
if the acquiring group is a high-tax or low-tax group.
36Grouptax2 equals one if at least one target is located in the same country like the acquirer and group
taxation is possible.
37The effect is not robust to a modification of Grouptax2. If this variable only equals one if at least one
target-company in the respective country shows a pre-deal loss, the significance for profitable acquirers
disappears. This might be due to the imprecise measure of loss situations of target-companies which
relies on accounting figures of one year before the deal.
38Results were similar when using the minimum instead of the mean target-company tax rates.
39This mean is weighted by the number of affiliates per country. For the tax rates of affiliated companies
I also used φτC . Results did not materially change, if I employed τC without φ instead.
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Sensitivity analysis
Table 7 presents sensitivity analyses for the logit approach on the basis of Column (4)
of Table 4. The first two columns split the sample into small and large deals, using the
median of the relative deal size as a percentage of the acquirer size for categorization.40
The large and significant coefficient of the tax variable for the larger deals and a non-
significant coefficient for the smaller deals indicate that particularly the financing decision
in large deals is influenced by taxes.
In the third column, I restricted the sample to observations where the acquirer has an
initial debt ratio smaller than 75%, to capture that thin-capitalization rules might restrict
the deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base if the leverage of the
considered company is too high.41 In most countries applying such rules, there is a save
haven, which is a pre-defined value for the debt-to-equity ratio. As long as companies
stay below that value, they do not have to be concerned about limitations of interest
deductibility. In most countries, this save haven amounts 3:1 or higher. Therefore, I
tried to exclude all firms that might be near a critical value before the acquistion takes
place by only keeping those firms showing a debt-to-asset ratio smaller than 75%. The
coefficient of φτCacq remains positive and significant. However, it is not larger compared to
the coefficient in Column (4) of Table 4.42
In specification (4), I dropped all acquirer-countries with observations for less than 3
years to control for outliers. This does not change the results. In Column (5), I introduced
the personal taxation on the shareholder level into the analysis. The additional variables
are the tax rate on dividend income, τDacq and the tax rate on interest income from loans
given to corporations, τ Iacq. The effect of φτ
C
acq remains stable but the two additional
variables do not have significant impact. The reason is either that personal taxation does
not matter for most of the companies or that the shareholders are not liable to taxation
in the country of the acquiring company. In Column (6), I only kept observations with
40The number of observations is not identical for both samples because some observations have to be
dropped due to collinearity problems when further reducing the sample.
41Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008), Haufler and Runkel (2012) and Büttner et al. (2010) an-
alyze if thin-capitalization rules result in a reduction of internal debt and whether this increases
fiscal revenue. Dreßler and Scheuering (2012) evaluate the effects of the introduction of a new thin-
capitalization rule in Germany in 2008.
42I obtained similar results when using other thresholds. The lower the threshold, the lower the coefficient
of φτCacq. It would be desirable to find out precisely how near a company is at a critical point in the
considered country. However, many countries only restrict the deductibility of interest for internal
loans or do not or not only look at the debt ratio to derive if a company is treated by thin-capitalization
rules or not. Since my data does not allow to distinguish between internal and external debt, I only
used this rough method to extract companies that should not be concerned with limitations.
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Table 7: Logit analysis using Debtij - sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smaller Larger Low debt > 2 years Personal Domestic
φτCacq −6.0395 30.4793∗∗ 11.5453∗ 12.7918∗∗ 16.1202∗∗ 14.8972
(0.437) (0.025) (0.060) (0.034) (0.010) (0.488)
τDacq 3.4323 2.5107
(0.602) (0.821)
τ Iacq 2.5054 5.2964
(0.262) (0.150)
Ln Deal valuej 0.1880 0.7818
∗∗∗ 0.5857∗∗∗ 0.6140∗∗∗ 0.6139∗∗∗ 0.5794∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei 0.2620
∗ −0.2830∗ −0.2046∗∗ −0.2035∗∗ −0.2001∗∗ −0.2640∗∗
(0.099) (0.056) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024) (0.050)
Initial debti 0.1152 1.4906
∗∗ 0.4586 0.3790 0.4191 1.4147
(0.931) (0.027) (0.539) (0.503) (0.453) (0.122)
Inflationacq −0.2313 0.0983 −0.2187 −0.0720 −0.0906 0.4905
(0.412) (0.554) (0.291) (0.630) (0.532) (0.366)
Domestic creditacq 0.0021 0.0447
∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗
(0.920) (0.001) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.028)
GDP growthacq −0.3437 0.1592 −0.0984 0.0481 −0.0043 −0.1473
(0.156) (0.465) (0.476) (0.680) (0.972) (0.523)
Stock marketacq −0.0379 −0.0262 −0.0057 −0.0124 −0.0072 −0.0099
(0.138) (0.156) (0.637) (0.215) (0.514) (0.626)
Distressi 0.0054 0.0825 −0.0973 −0.0535 0.0523 −0.3384
(0.990) (0.676) (0.646) (0.759) (0.764) (0.191)
D&Ai −5.9354 0.4478 −4.6194 1.8563 0.1746 −7.8838
(0.776) (0.960) (0.474) (0.725) (0.974) (0.511)
∆D&Ai 52.7138
∗∗ −3.0216 −3.1516 1.8148 0.1333 5.4546
(0.038) (0.737) (0.647) (0.786) (0.984) (0.652)
Tangibilityi 0.1274 −1.9649∗ −0.1412 −0.6711 −0.0936 −0.4638
(0.952) (0.087) (0.861) (0.409) (0.908) (0.822)
∆Tangibilityi −7.9700∗ −3.3290 −3.4625 −3.6169∗ −2.4684 −2.3532
(0.072) (0.120) (0.128) (0.086) (0.206) (0.649)
Profitabilityi −3.4006 −2.6489 −1.3099 −2.1159 −2.6457 5.9649
(0.644) (0.486) (0.623) (0.390) (0.257) (0.161)
∆Profitabilityi −9.6511 3.7158 0.1999 1.1746 0.5423 0.5030
(0.281) (0.160) (0.900) (0.419) (0.690) (0.868)
LCFj 0.2368 −0.0014 −0.0023 −0.0457 −0.0599 0.1353
(0.565) (0.996) (0.993) (0.840) (0.787) (0.770)
Observations 324 347 600 677 697 320
Log-likelihood −96.27 −149.35 −236.41 −271.63 −283.47 −118.42
Sensitivity 26.67 % 63.87 % 48.23 % 44.65 % 44.24 % 47.14 %
Specificity 97.49 % 90.79 % 94.34 % 93.82 % 93.61 % 95.60 %
%-pts improved 1.54 15.85 7.00 5.76 5.59 6.88
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debtij based on Column (4) in Table 4.
Independent variables are defined in Table 11. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample into small
and large deals. Column (3) restricts the sample to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt-to-asset
ratio smaller then 75%. In Column (4), all acquirer-countries with observations in less than 3
years are dropped. Column (5) introduces personal taxation into the analysis and Column (6)
restricts the sample to acquirers that are independent or do not have a global ultimate owner
abroad. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes
significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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an independent acquirer or where the acquiring company does not have a global ultimate
owner in another country in order to capture the last point. For those firms, the domestic
personal taxation should have a significant impact if it matters for the financing decision.
However, I only observe the current ownership structure of the acquirer and not the data
for the deal year. This can be the reason for the non-significant coefficient of τCacq in this
specification. In Table 7, the coefficient of Initial debti becomes positive and significant
in Column (2). This might reflect the debt capacity of the acquiring companies.43
Table 8 provides results of analogous sensitivity analyses for the debt ratio regression
(4) of Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) again split the sample into smaller and larger deals.
Now the median sum of deal values per acquirer and year as a percentage of the acquirers
pre-deal total assets is used for separation. Remarkably, the coefficient of the tax variable
is not significant in both samples, despite its significant impact in the whole sample.44
In Column (3), the sample is reduced to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt ratio smaller
than 75%. The coefficient of φτCacq is now larger as compared to Column (4) of Table
5, indicating that the tax advantage is more relevant for firms that are not too indebted
before the acquisition and therefore do not have to take into account a possible treatment
by thin-capitalization rules after a debt-financed deal. Column (4) restricts the sample to
acquirer-countries with observations in at least 3 years, to control for outliers which does
not change results qualitatively.
In Columns (5) and (6), I controlled for personal taxation at the shareholder level in the
acquirer-countries using τDacq and τ
I
acq. The results indicate that personal taxation is not
relevant for the financing decision of the acquiring companies in my sample, even those
that have no global ultimate owner abroad (compare Column (6)).45 The control variables
show similar coefficients compared to Table 5. The only difference is that Inflationacq has
a significant positive coefficient in Column (3).
43This result is reverse to the findings in the debt ratio analysis. However, the positive coefficient here
is only found for subsamples and is not robust for other specifications.
44When I separated according to the absolute rather than the relative size of the deals I found that
the tax variable has significant impact only for the smaller deals. For the larger deals I do not find
significant tax effects even when looking at different subgroups like the 25% largest deals or the larger
deals without the highest quantiles. The reason for these results might be that I do not observe the
deal values for all deals of the respective acquirers.
45For such firms, I argue that most personal shareholders should be residents of the country in which the
company is located.
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Table 8: OLS analysis using ∆Debti - sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smaller Larger Low debt > 2 years Personal Domestic
φτCacq 0.2715 0.3802 0.6603
∗∗ 0.5041∗∗ 0.5559∗∗ 0.6878∗∗
(0.319) (0.441) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
τDacq 0.0966 0.2406
(0.601) (0.286)
τ Iacq 0.0577 0.0614
(0.505) (0.463)
Ln Deal valuesj 0.0021 0.0217
∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Sizei −0.0026 −0.0185∗∗ −0.0098∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0098∗∗∗ −0.0063∗
(0.444) (0.022) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.070)
Initial debti −0.1006∗∗∗ −0.3145∗∗∗ −0.2583∗∗∗ −0.2123∗∗∗ −0.2178∗∗∗ −0.1945∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflationacq 0.0080 0.0032 0.0090
∗ 0.0049 0.0051 0.0018
(0.147) (0.570) (0.082) (0.235) (0.229) (0.748)
Domestic creditacq 0.0001 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007
(0.818) (0.280) (0.222) (0.263) (0.193) (0.144)
GDP growthacq −0.0016 0.0021 −0.0020 −0.0018 −0.0017 0.0010
(0.720) (0.686) (0.593) (0.562) (0.576) (0.804)
Stock marketacq −0.0003 −0.0016∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗ −0.0006
(0.355) (0.019) (0.001) (0.007) (0.034) (0.188)
Distressi 0.0066 0.0318
∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
D&Ai 0.4536 −0.2382 0.1312 0.1593 0.1191 0.0820
(0.143) (0.560) (0.628) (0.490) (0.608) (0.764)
∆D&Ai 0.3565 0.3285 0.4120 0.4922 0.4704 0.2924
(0.454) (0.637) (0.454) (0.332) (0.349) (0.632)
Tangibilityi 0.0415 0.1559
∗∗ 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗ 0.0824∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗
(0.198) (0.019) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.025)
∆Tangibilityi 0.0719 −0.0638 −0.0999 −0.0725 −0.0613 −0.0500
(0.685) (0.498) (0.396) (0.397) (0.474) (0.629)
Profitabilityi −0.1765∗ −0.3279∗∗ −0.2408∗∗∗ −0.1895∗∗ −0.1842∗∗ −0.2094∗∗
(0.065) (0.011) (0.008) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
∆Profitabilityi −0.2891∗ −0.0435∗∗∗ −0.0466∗∗∗ −0.0436∗∗∗ −0.0435∗∗∗ −0.0414∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
LCFsj 0.0018 −0.0063 0.0019 0.0023 0.0005 0.0007
(0.861) (0.701) (0.867) (0.806) (0.955) (0.939)
Observations 463 464 750 900 927 687
Adj. R2 0.06 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.12
The table shows OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆Debti based on Column (4) in Table
5. Independent variables are defined in Table 11. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample into
companies acquiring relatively small and large targets. Column (3) restricts the sample to acquirers
showing a pre-deal debt-to-asset ratio smaller then 75%. In Column (4), all acquirer-countries with
observations in less than 3 years are dropped. Column (5) introduces personal taxation into the
analysis and Column (6) restricts the sample to acquirers that are independent or do not have a
global ultimate owner abroad. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in
parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Comparison to Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005)
Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005) use a trichotomous tax variable, which directly
captures whether the acquirer is a loss-making company. The variable takes the value
zero, if the company has an operating loss and a negative taxable income before the deal,
and half of the statutory tax rate, if one of the two conditions is fulfilled. Only if both
characteristics indicate a profitable firm, the tax variable equals the statutory tax rate.46
In Table 9, I also employed similar kinds of variables for a better comparison with these
former studies. In particular, I used three different dichotomous variables. All of them
equal φτCacq, if the company is labeled as being profitable and zero if not.
47 Tax1 equals
zero if the acquiring company does not have a positive profit before the acquisition, i.e. if
LCFi equals one. Tax2 equals zero if the pre-deal operating profit measured by the EBIT
is negative. Tax3 equals zero if the sum of all taxes relating to the pre-deal accounting
period is less than or equal to zero. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9 show results of logit
specifications employing these dichotomous variables instead of φτCacq and using the full
set of control variables. Only Tax1 shows a significant coefficient, which is in line with
findings in Table 4 where the tax advantage of debt also affected the financing decision of
profitable acquirers in particular. However, the coefficient is smaller using Tax1. Another
difference compared to Table 4 is that the loss dummy for the acquirer now gets a positive
and significant coefficient. The reason might be that, controlling for the tax effect of the
loss carry-forward, this variable captures that firms in difficult economic situations have
to finance their investments through the capital market because they do not have many
retained earnings and investors avoid placing their money in such companies. However,
these findings are not robust to the altered definitions of the dichotomous tax variable,
which can be seen in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 9.
Columns (4) to (6) depict the same specifications for the debt ratio analysis. In these
models none of the variables Tax1, Tax2 and Tax3 is found to significantly influence the
financing decision of acquiring companies. This is not surprising because we already see in
Table 5 that the tax advantage does not seem to differ between loss-making and profitable
firms.
46The trichotomous tax variable was suggested by Graham (1996). It equals "zero if the acquiring firm
has net operating losses and a negative taxable income in the year prior to the acquisition, one-half
the top statutory tax rate if the acquiring firm had either a net operating loss, or negative taxable
income in the year prior to the acquisition, and the top statutory tax rate if the acquirer had neither
a net operating loss nor negative taxable income in the year prior to the acquisition", see Erickson
(1998), p. 285. The definition of this variable captures if the acquirer is near tax exhaustion. As an
alternative measure, Erickson (1998) uses an indicator variable for a net operating loss.
47I do not employ a trichotomous variable as I cannot observe the companies' tax positions by only
considering accounting figures.
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Table 9: Logit using Debtij and OLS using ∆Debti - dichotomous tax variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS
Tax1 11.1965∗∗∗ 0.0251
(0.004) (0.930)
Tax2 −0.2770 −0.0247
(0.751) (0.563)
Tax3 −0.3266 0.0319
(0.657) (0.350)
Ln Deal value(s)j 0.5762
∗∗∗ 0.5734∗∗∗ 0.5696∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.1824∗∗ −0.1865∗∗ −0.1835∗∗ −0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0089∗∗∗ −0.0087∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Initial debti 0.7360 0.7934
∗ 0.7375 −0.2631∗∗∗ −0.2616∗∗∗ −0.2633∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.092) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LCFi 2.9674
∗∗ −0.4678 −0.4600∗ 0.0049 −0.0061 −0.0024
(0.016) (0.124) (0.094) (0.957) (0.720) (0.871)
Inflationacq −0.0446 −0.0156 −0.0291 0.0047 0.0048 0.0043
(0.751) (0.906) (0.823) (0.234) (0.234) (0.301)
Domestic creditacq 0.0166
∗∗ 0.0150∗ 0.0156∗ 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
(0.045) (0.070) (0.059) (0.415) (0.415) (0.355)
GDP growthacq 0.0280 0.0778 0.0728 0.0022 0.0021 0.0022
(0.770) (0.429) (0.461) (0.510) (0.534) (0.502)
Stock marketacq −0.0075 −0.0116 −0.0129∗ −0.0009∗∗ −0.0009∗∗ −0.0009∗∗
(0.324) (0.135) (0.093) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Distressi −0.0377 −0.0322 −0.0213 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗
(0.805) (0.829) (0.889) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
D&Ai −4.3784 −3.8194 −3.5532 −0.0517 −0.0532 −0.0685
(0.385) (0.443) (0.470) (0.784) (0.780) (0.719)
∆D&Ai 3.8821 4.5209 3.9005 0.5144
∗ 0.5078∗ 0.4980∗
(0.525) (0.463) (0.514) (0.081) (0.089) (0.100)
Tangibilityi 0.6875 0.7753 0.7512 0.0651
∗ 0.0676∗ 0.0640∗
(0.390) (0.313) (0.325) (0.065) (0.056) (0.072)
∆Tangibilityi −2.6220∗ −2.5726∗ −2.8168∗ 0.0218 0.0226 0.0222
(0.084) (0.085) (0.064) (0.789) (0.779) (0.788)
Profitabilityi −0.1420 −0.3043 −0.4735 −0.0263 −0.0191 −0.0334
(0.931) (0.854) (0.773) (0.746) (0.816) (0.696)
∆Profitabilityi −0.3899 −0.3279 −0.1866 −0.0646∗∗ −0.0648∗∗ −0.0646∗∗
(0.769) (0.805) (0.888) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
LCF(s)j −0.2185 −0.1945 −0.1949 0.0038 0.0038 0.0046
(0.226) (0.280) (0.276) (0.671) (0.669) (0.607)
Observations 940 940 924 1, 194 1, 194 1, 177
Log-likelihood −368.06 −370.96 −367.45 − − −
Sensitivity 35.86 % 35.86 % 35.53 % − − −
Specificity 96.09 % 94.61 % 94.50 % − − −
%-pts improved 4.46 3.29 3.25 − − −
Adj. R2 − − − 0.17 0.17 0.17
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debtij in Columns (1) to (3) based on
Column (3) of Table 4 and OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆Debti in Columns (4) to (6)
based on Column (3) of Table 5. Independent variables are defined in Table 11. Columns (1) and
(4) employ Tax1, Columns (2) and (5) use Tax2 and Column (3) and (6) apply Tax3 instead of
φτCacq. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes
significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Ultimately, I chose to rely on results from Tables 4 and 5. The dichotomous tax variables
implicitly assume that the tax advantage of debt only exists for firms which have taxable
profits in the pre-deal period whereas by using φτCacq and the loss dummy or an interaction,
I allowed the data itself to resolve this issue.
For a better comparison of my results with the findings of Erickson (1998), I also
conducted the logit analysis for modeling the probability to observe a debt-financed deal
by employing another dependent variable, DebtBij. This variable sharply distinguishes
between debt-financed deals and stock-financed acquisitions and is defined in section 4.2.
Results are presented in Tables 14 to 17 in the Appendix. Generally, all results regarding
the tax variables are similar to the output presented in the last sections. However, the
levels of significance are lower using DebtBij. Some of the control variables lose significance
in several specifications, for example Sizei. In contrast, the significance of other variables
gets stronger, especially for Domestic creditacq and Stock marketacq. I discussed the results
of specifications using Debtij due to the larger coverage of this variable. Furthermore, I
also employed DebtCij leading to qualitatively similar results. I do not show them because
of limited validity due to the very low numbers of observations (between 117 and 381,
when including all control variables).
7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effects of profit taxation on the financing decision of corporate
acquisitions. Due to the deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base,
acquiring companies can save taxes by financing a takeover with debt and afterwards
offsetting the interest expenses with profits in the following periods. For the empirical
analysis I employed two approaches.
The first approach deals with the particular decision of how to finance the considered
deal. Using information from Zephyr, a M&A database provided by Bureau van Dijk, I
investigated the determinants of the question of whether a corporate acquisition should
be financed with debt or equity. My sample consists of 3,717 deals with acquirers in
31 countries. I found empirical evidence for the hypothesis that companies in high-tax
countries rather use debt than equity compared to acquirers in low-tax countries. This
effect can especially be carved out for profitable acquirers and for large deals. Limitations
of this kind of analysis might be that I could not observe how much debt was used and
that the financing decision of acquisitions may not have been independent from other
investments of the same company around the deal.
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Therefore, in a second step, I investigated the whole capital structure development of
the acquiring companies during the deal period. According to my findings, the change of
the debt-to-asset ratio is 0.55%-points higher if the tax advantage of debt increases by
one %-point. However, I cannot accept the hypothesis that the tax advantage is relevant
especially for profitable acquirers. Since the simple loss indicator variable does not contain
information about the future development and the expectations of decision-makers, this
result is not surprising. Even loss-making firms might be very profitable in the future and
consequently have an incentive to decrease taxable profits by additional interest expenses.
Restricting the sample to multinational acquirers, I found that a possible tax consoli-
dation in the target-country may enhance the use of equity if the acquirer is profitable,
because losses of the target-company can be used to reduce the taxable profit of the ac-
quiring company. In addition, the acquirer's tax rate effect depends on the other tax rates
that the multinational group faces: The higher the weighted average tax rate outside the
acquirer-country, the lower the effect of the acquirer's tax rate on its capital structure
development around the deal.
In summary, the financing decision in corporate acquisitions seems to be influenced by
profit taxation leading to a larger fraction of debt-financing in high-tax countries. This
could lead to economic distortions, for example, the execution of acquisitions that would
not have been profitable in a world without interest deductibility.
8 Appendix
8.1 Details of Information on Deal Financing in Zephyr
The information for the dependent variables in the logit analysis was collected from three
variables in the Zephyr-database. From the variable DEAL FINANCING I used entries
such as vendor placing, leveraged buy out and new bank facilities. Vendor placing means
that the seller of the target-company becomes a shareholder of the acquiring company after
the deal and is an indicator for equity-financing. The other two entries are indicators for
debt-financing. A second variable, METHOD OF PAYMENT, contains entries such as
shares, which indicates equity-financing, and loan notes and debt assumed, which indicate
debt-financing. In addition, this variable reports if the acquisition price is at least partly
paid in cash. In a third variable, DEAL SUBTYPE, that mainly describes the kind of
the deal, I also rarely found the entry leveraged buy out.
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In contrast to Erickson (1998), Dhaliwal et al. (2005) only look at cash deals. Therefore,
I also tried to identify the method of financing for cash deals. For this reason I redefined
Debtij and DebtBij and only used deals where the variable METHOD OF PAYMENT
contained cash. Surprisingly, the fraction of debt-financed deals remained at a very low
level of about 14-15%, compare Table 10. In contrast, in the study of Dhaliwal et al.
(2005) about two third of cash deals were mainly debt-financed. In my opinion, this
result indicates a data problem regarding the identification of cash deals and I therefore
abstained from using these variables in further empirical analyses.
Table 10: Information about deal financing of cash deals
Variable Equal 1 Equal 0 % Equal 1 ∆Tax rate P-value
Debtij , cash only 414 2,321 15.1% 0.007 0.009
DebtBij , cash only 340 2,028 14.4% 0.008 0.003
Numbers of debt-financed and non-debt-financed deals. ∆Tax rate shows the differ-
ence of the average φτCacq between debt-financed and non-debt-financed deals. The
last column depicts the corresponding p-value of a standard t-test with unequal
variances that this difference equals zero.
8.2 Further Figures and Tables
Table 11: Variable definitions
∆TAX Tax advantage of debt.
TAXequity Tax payments for equity-financed investment.
TAXdebt Tax payments for debt-financed investment.
pi Net earnings
φτCacq Fraction of interest expenses deductible from the corporate income tax
base times the combined statutory corporate income tax rate in the
completion year of the acquisition.
τDacq Additional taxation of dividend income on the personal level in the com-
pletion year of the acquisition, = (1− φτCacq)τPacq, where τPacq is the per-
sonal tax rate on dividend income.
τ Iacq Additional taxation of interest income on the personal level in the com-
pletion year of the acquisition for loans given to companies.
Tax1 Dichotomous variable, = φτCacq if acquirer's pre-deal profit before tax is
larger than zero and zero otherwise.
Tax2 Dichotomous variable, = φτCacq if acquirer's pre-deal EBIT is larger than
zero and zero otherwise.
to be continued on the next page
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Table 11: Variable definitions (continued)
Tax3 Dichotomous variable, = φτCacq if acquirer's pre-deal taxation is larger
than zero and zero otherwise.
Grouptax Indicator variable, equals one if the acquirer and the target-company
are located in the same country and the target-country applies a group
taxation regime.
φτCacq − τCtar Difference between the acquirer and the target-country tax rate in the
completion year of the acquisition. If acquirer and target are located in
the same country, the variable is zero.
φτCmean Weighted average tax rate of the whole 50% ownership chain of the
acquirer in the acquisition year, the mean is weighted by the number of
affiliates per country.
Grouptax2 Indicator variable, equals one if at least one target-company is located
in the acquirer-country and group taxation is possible.
φτCacq − τCtarmean Difference between the acquirer-country tax rate and the average tax
rate of the targets acquired in the considered period.
φτCmean outside Weighted average tax rate of all affiliates outside the acquirer-country,
the mean is weighted by the number of affiliates per country.
i Interest rate.
D Amount of debt.
Vij Part of the value of acquiring firm i determined by capital structure
choice for acquisition j.
α, β, δacq, δt, δind, Parameters to be estimated.
Xij , Control variables.
ij Error term.
P (Debtij = 1) Probability that acquisition j coducted by firm i is financed with debt.
Debtij Dependent variable, equals one if deal j is at least partly debt-financed
and zero otherwise.
DebtBij Dependent variable, equals one if deal j is at least partly debt-financed
and not paid with stock and zero if it is only equity-financed.
DebtCij Dependent variable, equals one if deal j is at least partly debt-financed
and not paid with stock and zero if it is only equity-financed. Deals for
which the only information is that they were paid in cash are excluded.
Ln Deal valuej Logarithm of the deal value of the acquisition in thousand EUR. For
the debt ratio analysis, the logarithm of the sum of values of all ac-
quisitions undertaken by the acquirer in the considered year is used
(Ln Deal valuesj).
to be continued on the next page
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Table 11: Variable definitions (continued)
Sizei Logarithm of the acquirer's pre-deal total assets in thousand EUR.
Initial debti Acquirer's pre-deal debt-to-asset ratio (one year before the completion
year).
LCFi Indicator variable, equals one if the acquirer's pre-deal book profit before
tax is lower than zero and zero if it is equal or larger than zero.
Inflationacq Consumer price index in percent in the completion year of the
acquisition.
Domestic creditacq Domestic credit provided by banking sector in percent of GDP in the
completion year of the acquisition.
GDP growthacq Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices in the comple-
tion year of the acquisition.
Stock marketacq Market capitalization of listed companies in percent of GDP in the com-
pletion year of the acquisition.
Distressi = (1.2 ∗ working capital + 3.3 ∗ EBIT + 1.0 ∗ sales)/total assets, pre-
deal value for the acquirer, following Altman (2000) and MacKie-Mason
(1990).
D&Ai Acquirer's pre-deal depreciation and amortization as a fraction of total
assets.
∆D&Ai Acquirer's change in depreciation and amortization as a fraction of total
assets in the completion year of the acquisition compared to the pre-deal
value.
Tangibilityi Acquirer's pre-deal tangible assets as a fraction of total assets.
∆Tangibilityi Acquirer's change in tangible assets as a fraction of total assets in the
completion year of the acquisition compared to the pre-deal value.
Profitabilityi Acquirer's pre-deal EBITDA as a fraction of total assets.
∆Profitabilityi Acquirer's change in EBITDA as a fraction of total assets in the com-
pletion year of the acquisition compared to the pre-deal value.
LCFj Indicator variable, equals one if the target's pre-deal book profit before
tax is lower than zero and zero if it is equal or larger than zero. For
the debt ratio analysis, this indicator equals one if at least one of the
acquired targets shows a negative income (LCFsj).
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Table 12: Observations per acquirer-country - logit analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Austria 28 0.75 5 0.53 4 0.57
Belgium 90 2.42 41 4.36 32 4.59
Bulgaria 15 0.4 7 0.74 5 0.72
Cyprus 4 0.11 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 16 0.43 0 0 0 0
Denmark 26 0.7 0 0 0 0
Estonia 10 0.27 0 0 0 0
Finland 146 3.93 77 8.19 49 7.03
France 438 11.78 199 21.17 168 24.1
Germany 209 5.62 42 4.47 31 4.45
Greece 66 1.78 35 3.72 31 4.45
Hungary 16 0.43 2 0.21 0 0
Ireland 11 0.3 0 0 0 0
Italy 318 8.56 161 17.13 121 17.36
Japan 40 1.08 0 0 0 0
Korea 308 8.29 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 10 0.27 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 20 0.54 0 0 0 0
Norway 87 2.34 18 1.91 15 2.15
Poland 165 4.44 13 1.38 8 1.15
Portugal 38 1.02 15 1.6 12 1.72
Romania 39 1.05 12 1.28 10 1.43
Russia 134 3.61 0 0 0 0
Singapore 34 0.91 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 21 0.56 0 0 0 0
Spain 308 8.29 164 17.45 137 19.66
Sweden 356 9.58 147 15.64 74 10.62
Turkey 5 0.13 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 7 0.19 2 0.21 0 0
United Kingdom 704 18.94 0 0 0 0
United States 48 1.29 0 0 0 0
Total 3,717 100 940 100 697 100
The table shows the number of observations per country for the analysis of the probabil-
ity to observe a debt-financed deal using Debtij as the dependent variable. Columns (1)
and (2) show the respective numbers for the base specification (1) of Table 4. Columns
(3) and (4) refer to specification (3) of Table 4, which includes all control variables.
Columns (5) and (6) depict numbers for specification (4) of Table 4, which restricts the
sample to profitable acquirers.
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Table 13: Observations per acquirer-country - OLS analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Austria 25 0.57 5 0.42 4 0.43
Belgium 122 2.78 52 4.36 41 4.42
Bulgaria 22 0.5 10 0.84 9 0.97
Cyprus 3 0.07 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 27 0.62 11 0.92 11 1.19
Denmark 40 0.91 0 0 0 0
Estonia 33 0.75 8 0.67 8 0.86
Finland 164 3.74 64 5.36 46 4.96
France 456 10.39 224 18.76 184 19.85
Germany 222 5.06 44 3.69 34 3.67
Greece 103 2.35 49 4.1 42 4.53
Hungary 19 0.43 3 0.25 2 0.22
Ireland 7 0.16 0 0 0 0
Italy 428 9.75 239 20.02 187 20.17
Japan 66 1.5 0 0 0 0
Korea 331 7.54 0 0 0 0
Latvia 6 0.14 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 6 0.14 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 8 0.18 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 23 0.52 1 0.08 0 0
Norway 119 2.71 19 1.59 16 1.73
Poland 249 5.67 32 2.68 23 2.48
Portugal 66 1.5 27 2.26 22 2.37
Romania 50 1.14 14 1.17 12 1.29
Russia 262 5.97 0 0 0 0
Singapore 25 0.57 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 4 0.09 1 0.08 0 0
Slovenia 28 0.64 5 0.42 5 0.54
Spain 438 9.98 236 19.77 201 21.68
Sweden 360 8.2 143 11.98 76 8.2
Turkey 5 0.11 0 0 0 0
Ukraine 10 0.23 7 0.59 4 0.43
United Kingdom 643 14.65 0 0 0 0
United States 19 0.43 0 0 0 0
Total 4,389 100 1,194 100 927 100
The table shows the number of observations per country for the debt ratio analysis using
∆Debti as the dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) show the respective numbers
for the base specification (1) of Table 5. Columns (3) and (4) refer to specification (3)
of Table 5, which includes all control variables. Columns (5) and (6) depict numbers
for specification (4) of Table 5, which restricts the sample to profitable acquirers.
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Table 14: Logit analysis using DebtBij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Small sample Full model Profitable Interaction
φτCacq −1.6514 8.6062 8.0917 10.5807∗ 9.3755
(0.703) (0.148) (0.171) (0.086) (0.112)
φτCacq ∗ LCFi −13.7596∗∗
(0.012)
Ln Deal valuej 0.4286
∗∗∗ 0.5091∗∗∗ 0.5085∗∗∗ 0.5571∗∗∗ 0.5059∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.1117∗∗∗ −0.1021 −0.1124 −0.1353 −0.1024
(0.000) (0.125) (0.148) (0.127) (0.191)
Initial debti 0.4386 0.8097 0.8933
∗ 0.4425 0.8468
(0.109) (0.127) (0.093) (0.447) (0.120)
LCFi −0.3429∗∗∗ −0.5685∗∗ −0.6352∗ 3.5816∗∗
(0.005) (0.047) (0.053) (0.044)
Inflationacq −0.1069∗ −0.0257 −0.0149 −0.0407 −0.0155
(0.061) (0.854) (0.911) (0.783) (0.913)
Domestic creditacq 0.0055 0.0259
∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growthacq −0.0654 0.1020 0.0919 0.0151 0.0728
(0.164) (0.397) (0.449) (0.921) (0.541)
Stock marketacq 0.0011 −0.0184∗∗ −0.0186∗∗ −0.0252∗∗ −0.0196∗∗
(0.793) (0.037) (0.031) (0.014) (0.018)
Distressi 0.0127 0.1212 0.0209
(0.934) (0.492) (0.893)
D&Ai −2.0068 1.7786 −2.0562
(0.738) (0.764) (0.737)
∆D&Ai 6.9485 2.0466 7.0474
(0.302) (0.765) (0.299)
Tangibilityi 0.7879 0.0544 0.6546
(0.341) (0.950) (0.444)
∆Tangibilityi −3.3501∗ −3.4108 −3.6108∗∗
(0.050) (0.108) (0.037)
Profitabilityi −0.9067 −3.1535 −0.6440
(0.619) (0.248) (0.729)
∆Profitabilityi −0.1296 0.5939 −0.1687
(0.926) (0.705) (0.906)
LCFj −0.2542 −0.1121 −0.2705
(0.214) (0.632) (0.185)
Observations 3,406 844 844 631 844
Log-likelihood -1,324.94 -326.60 -321.19 -257.02 -319.01
Sensitivity 18.06 % 35.84 % 37.57 % 47.65 % 38.15 %
Specificity 97.57 % 95.83 % 95.23 % 94.61 % 95.38 %
%-pts improved 1.23 4.03 3.91 7.13 4.15
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtBij . Independent variables are
defined in Table 11. Column (1) is the baseline regression. Column (2) restricts the sample to
observations where additional control variables are not missing and Column (3) adds these controls.
In Column (4), the sample only consists of profitable acquiring companies and in Column (5) an
interaction term between φτCacq and LCFi is used to identify a difference in the tax effect for loss-
making and profitable firms. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in
parentheses. ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 15: Multinational tax planning, DebtBij
(1) (2) (3)
φτCacq 8.0815 7.9621
(0.174) (0.187)
Grouptax −0.2852
(0.485)
LCFi∗Grouptax −0.1218
(0.863)
LCFj∗Grouptax 0.3979
(0.458)
φτCacq − τCtar −2.5206
(0.428)
φτCmean 5.8167
(0.230)
Ln Deal valuej 0.4977
∗∗∗ 0.4867∗∗∗ 0.5002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.0910 −0.0601 −0.0778
(0.249) (0.467) (0.336)
Initial debti 0.6212 0.3450 0.7024
(0.333) (0.578) (0.254)
LCFi −0.4728 −0.6073 −0.5476
(0.433) (0.127) (0.183)
Inflationacq 0.2088 0.2220 0.2425
(0.341) (0.325) (0.283)
Domestic creditacq 0.0357
∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
GDP growthacq 0.2657
∗ 0.2884∗ 0.2410
(0.086) (0.068) (0.111)
Stock marketacq −0.0184∗ −0.0213∗ −0.0199∗∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.028)
Distressi 0.1134 0.1382 0.0988
(0.496) (0.397) (0.551)
D&Ai −7.4605 −7.4715 −7.1629
(0.284) (0.300) (0.308)
∆D&Ai 6.2973 6.0708 6.3792
(0.362) (0.351) (0.350)
Tangibilityi 1.2968 1.3133 1.2842
(0.228) (0.232) (0.249)
∆Tangibilityi −3.4893 −3.6370 −3.5462
(0.149) (0.136) (0.156)
Profitabilityi −1.2463 −1.5674 −1.2885
(0.595) (0.483) (0.581)
∆Profitabilityi −0.3863 −0.6516 −0.3141
(0.824) (0.712) (0.857)
to be continued on the next page
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Table 15: Multinational tax planning, DebtBij (continued)
LCFj −0.4736 −0.2773 −0.2234
(0.187) (0.210) (0.312)
Observations 692 684 695
Log-likelihood −260.81 −257.37 −262.49
Sensitivity 40.28 % 40.56 % 40.97 %
Specificity 95.99 % 95.93 % 96.19 %
%-pts improved 5.20 5.27 5.47
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtBij based
on Column (3) of Table 14. Independent variables are defined in Table
11. In Column (1), I controlled for a potential group tax regime. In
Column (2), I tested if the financing decision is sensitive to the differ-
ence between acquirer- and target-country tax rates. In Column (3), I
tested if the weighted average tax rate of the multinational group influ-
ences the financing decision. All specifications include acquirer-country,
year- and industry-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the
acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. ∗ de-
notes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the
1%-level.
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Table 16: Logit analysis using DebtBij - sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smaller Larger Low debt > 2 years Personal Domestic
φτCacq −5.5476 24.5864∗ 6.3608 8.2872 13.2418∗∗ 15.6226
(0.479) (0.060) (0.285) (0.173) (0.037) (0.517)
τDacq 7.1371 13.4875
(0.260) (0.217)
τ Iacq 1.0128 1.9613
(0.662) (0.579)
Ln Deal valuej 0.1917 0.6612
∗∗∗ 0.5391∗∗∗ 0.5655∗∗∗ 0.5637∗∗∗ 0.4963∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei 0.2869
∗ −0.1956 −0.1479 −0.1534∗ −0.1430 −0.1578
(0.084) (0.183) (0.152) (0.088) (0.114) (0.298)
Initial debti −0.4322 1.2996∗ 0.2482 0.3747 0.4524 1.0789
(0.748) (0.064) (0.734) (0.527) (0.452) (0.271)
Inflationacq −0.1177 0.1405 −0.1528 −0.0118 −0.0583 0.6162
(0.632) (0.407) (0.461) (0.938) (0.694) (0.298)
Domestic creditacq 0.0048 0.0512
∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0358∗
(0.833) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.055)
GDP growthacq −0.3601 0.1705 −0.1855 0.0588 0.0109 −0.2602
(0.116) (0.516) (0.249) (0.686) (0.942) (0.443)
Stock marketacq −0.0508∗ −0.0382∗ −0.0220∗ −0.0259∗∗ −0.0197∗ −0.0136
(0.082) (0.058) (0.064) (0.011) (0.069) (0.483)
Distressi 0.0621 0.1996 −0.0305 0.0091 0.1149 −0.2271
(0.885) (0.287) (0.894) (0.959) (0.512) (0.430)
D&Ai −8.4067 6.5343 −2.2592 2.8066 1.6748 −14.2476
(0.701) (0.459) (0.757) (0.632) (0.779) (0.318)
∆D&Ai 53.6644
∗∗ 0.1712 −0.0302 3.4569 1.6105 12.8384
(0.049) (0.985) (0.997) (0.628) (0.817) (0.238)
Tangibilityi 0.6073 −2.2097∗ −0.0129 −0.3560 0.0987 1.4122
(0.760) (0.074) (0.988) (0.680) (0.910) (0.545)
∆Tangibilityi −6.4542 −4.3606∗ −3.8162 −3.9941∗ −3.2783 0.1553
(0.140) (0.081) (0.129) (0.071) (0.118) (0.978)
Profitabilityi −3.7509 −4.3489 −2.4465 −2.0924 −3.1416 4.3903
(0.608) (0.317) (0.441) (0.446) (0.246) (0.292)
∆Profitabilityi −14.3953 4.3538 0.0007 1.3988 0.5139 −0.6540
(0.178) (0.113) (1.000) (0.391) (0.736) (0.815)
LCFj 0.1463 −0.0961 −0.0398 −0.1403 −0.1307 0.0082
(0.725) (0.781) (0.884) (0.556) (0.576) (0.987)
Observations 298 315 544 616 631 287
Log-likelihood −92.36 −132.62 −214.11 −247.20 −256.39 −102.39
Sensitivity 31.11 % 61.54 % 46.83 % 46.90 % 45.64 % 46.67 %
Specificity 96.84 % 89.10 % 94.02 % 93.42 % 94.61 % 95.15 %
%-pts improved 2.01 13.02 6.25 6.01 6.65 5.93
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtBij based on Column (4) in Table
14. Independent variables are defined in Table 11. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample into
small and large deals. Column (3) restricts the sample to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt-to-
asset ratio smaller then 75%. In Column (4), all acquirer-countries with observations in less than
3 years are dropped. Column (5) introduces personal taxation into the analysis and Column (6)
restricts the sample to acquirers that are independent or do not have a global ultimate owner
abroad. All specifications include acquirer-country-, year- and industry-fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. ∗ denotes
significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level.
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Table 17: Logit analysis, DebtBij - dichotomous tax variables
(1) (2) (3)
Tax1 11.7085∗∗∗
(0.005)
Tax2 −0.6018
(0.494)
Tax3 0.0703
(0.933)
Ln Deal valuej 0.5073
∗∗∗ 0.5038∗∗∗ 0.5049∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sizei −0.1049 −0.1103 −0.1092
(0.178) (0.153) (0.161)
Initial debti 0.8452 0.9519
∗ 0.8196
(0.119) (0.070) (0.126)
LCFi 2.9552
∗∗ −0.7068∗∗ −0.6179∗
(0.026) (0.039) (0.055)
Inflationacq −0.0239 0.0101 0.0068
(0.868) (0.940) (0.959)
Domestic creditacq 0.0289
∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0279∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growthacq 0.0695 0.1096 0.1126
(0.564) (0.361) (0.351)
Stock marketacq −0.0183∗∗ −0.0222∗∗∗ −0.0222∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.007) (0.008)
Distressi 0.0196 0.0238 0.0218
(0.900) (0.877) (0.888)
D&Ai −2.1055 −1.5879 −1.3586
(0.730) (0.791) (0.815)
∆D&Ai 6.9342 7.3258 6.2088
(0.304) (0.284) (0.343)
Tangibilityi 0.6589 0.8795 0.7920
(0.439) (0.287) (0.338)
∆Tangibilityi −3.5671∗∗ −3.3761∗∗ −3.6640∗∗
(0.039) (0.048) (0.037)
Profitabilityi −0.6664 −0.6887 −1.2279
(0.719) (0.715) (0.515)
∆Profitabilityi −0.1712 −0.0638 0.0877
(0.904) (0.964) (0.950)
LCFj −0.2759 −0.2221 −0.2414
(0.174) (0.268) (0.224)
Observations 844 844 830
Log-likelihood −319.12 −321.64 −319.95
Sensitivity 39.31 % 36.42 % 36.42 %
Specificity 95.53 % 95.83 % 95.13 %
%-pts improved 4.50 4.15 3.73
The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtBij based
on Column (3) of Table 14. Independent variables are defined in Table
11. Column (1) employs Tax1, Column (2) uses Tax2 and Column
(3) applies Tax3 instead of φτCacq. All specifications include acquirer-
country-, year- and industry-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses.
∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at
the 1%-level.
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